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INTRODUCTION 6 
 7 
 The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation began developing a multi-site initiative in 8 
1986 that would employ community-generated strategies to reduce the use and abuse of 9 
alcohol and illegal drugs.  From a community planning phase that began in 1990 through 10 
two phases of implementation, the Fighting Back initiative has been in place for 12 years, 11 
backed by a Foundation investment of $88 million.  This figure includes $14 million for 12 
an independent evaluation commissioned by the Foundation to measure the results of 13 
Fighting Back, particularly to determine whether and how much reduction in drug and 14 
alcohol use occurred in the target communities.  In early 2002, the conclusion of the 15 
evaluators was that across the Fighting Back sites, the initiative did not produce 16 
significant reductions in use.  There were measurable reductions in the use of some 17 
substances in some individual sites, but the evaluators do not attribute these to the 18 
activities of the Fighting Back groups. 19 
 20 
These findings are not the end of the Fighting Back story.  They have stirred new 21 
attempts to understand what happened in Fighting Back – both what happened in the 22 
communities that were funded to work on the “demand side” of the drug equation and 23 
what happened in the course of the national evaluation of the initiative.  Much about the 24 
evaluation is questioned by some of the stakeholders – for example, whether its focus on 25 
measuring reduction in alcohol and drug use adequately reflected the original goals of the 26 
initiative; whether the comparison communities used were really comparable; whether it 27 
is appropriate to conclude that there has been no significant change in alcohol and drug 28 
use in the Fighting Back communities without pre-initiative baseline data for these 29 
measures; whether cross-site measures fit the originators‟ expectations about site 30 
variation; whether enough effort was made to develop outcome measures other than 31 
reductions in use; whether telephone surveys are a reasonable method for collecting data 32 
on illegal personal behavior; and whether there was adequate implementation research to 33 
explain why no impacts were found. 34 
 35 
 36 
 37 
 38 
 39 
 40 
 41 
 42 
 43 
 44 
 45 
 46 
This case was created as part of the Evaluation Roundtable, a project 
funded by the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, the James Irvine 
Foundation, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation , the John S. and James L. 
Knight Foundation, the David and Lucile Packard Foundation, and the Wallace 
Reader‟s Digest Funds, to help foundations improve their understanding and 
use of evaluation in their work.  The Evaluation Roundtable was directed by 
Patricia Patrizi, principal of Patrizi Associates. 
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Equally significant issues are questioned – usually by other stakeholders -- about 1 
the Fighting Back intervention.  Was the intervention a “model” that could be evaluated 2 
in the ways that demonstration programs have been evaluated in the past?  Was it a 3 
powerful enough intervention to expect measurable reductions in alcohol and drug use?  4 
Was it specified closely enough to warrant a multi-site, outcome evaluation without first 5 
investigating the feasibility of the approach?  Was the site monitoring and assistance 6 
adequate to detect and correct misalignment among the goals and activities of Fighting 7 
Back communities, the Foundation‟s expectations, and the evaluator‟s measures?  What 8 
were the originators‟ views of what success might look like and were these clear inside 9 
and outside the Foundation?  Were there enough sites for this highly experimental anti-10 
drug approach to produce useful evaluation information?  Did the Fighting Back 11 
community leaders understand how their success would be measured?  Were the 12 
activities of the Fighting Back communities likely to produce reductions in alcohol and 13 
drug use within the timeframe of the initiative and the evaluation? 14 
 15 
 Finally, the broader role of the Foundation in the Fighting Back story comes up.  16 
What were the organizational structures, traditions, external pressures, and elements of 17 
organizational culture that contributed to such a long and sizable investment in an 18 
initiative that never showed signs of making a difference in the initiative communities 19 
based on the independent evaluation? 20 
 21 
 James R. (Jim) Knickman, the Foundation‟s current Vice President for Research 22 
and Evaluation, characterizes the questioning of the evaluation at this point as second 23 
guessing.  At the final meeting of the Fighting Back initiative‟s National Advisory 24 
Committee in March 2002, he asked, “If the results had gone the other way, would we be 25 
raising questions about measures?”  One outsider with experience in measuring 26 
community-level impacts of similar program interventions -- Leonard Bickman, Director 27 
of the Center for Mental Health Policy at Vanderbilt University and an advisor to the 28 
Fighting Back evaluation -- says that the intervention couldn‟t have succeeded.  People 29 
inside and outside the Foundation who are most closely associated with the Fighting 30 
Back program doubt that the evaluation captured the achievements of the funded 31 
communities.  Leonard Saxe, the Principal Investigator for the research team that 32 
completed the Fighting Back evaluation, says that “on a community-wide basis, the 33 
program has not had the hypothesized impact.  The programs did not make a difference 34 
on the original measures; they haven‟t met that initial promise.”  But, explaining the 35 
resistance of program people to these findings, he pointed to some of the complicated 36 
history of the evaluation that is described in this case:  “By the time we actually had data, 37 
it was too late to change things.  [The program people] were so invested in the model and 38 
the cause.” 39 
 40 
There are multiple perspectives on the Fighting Back evaluation, high emotions, 41 
and unresolved conflicts.  This case presents the differing perspectives without judgment 42 
or conclusions.  It is a complicated story that enfolds many issues foundations face in 43 
evaluating their investments.  On most issues here, there are generally two views – the 44 
“program” view and the “evaluation” view.  Interestingly, only a few of the facts are in 45 
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dispute.  The interpretations of the facts, the meanings, and the lessons are mainly at 1 
issue. 2 
 3 
 4 
BACKGROUND: DURATION AND SCALE CONTRIBUTE TO COMPLEXITY 5 
 6 
The duration and scale of the Fighting Back activities – including the evaluation – 7 
are important contributors to the complexity of the interconnected stories of the 8 
intervention and its evaluation.  The initiative was conceived as a major Foundation effort 9 
and investment, but it was extended in time, entailing even greater financial 10 
commitments.  One result was that the starting vision and cast of Fighting Back 11 
stakeholders differed in important ways from the 2002 intervention and stakeholders.  12 
Among the changes that occurred during the 12 years of Foundation-funded local activity 13 
were: 14 
 15 
 The number of communities funded as Fighting Back sites was reduced from 15 16 
to 5 and within communities there was considerable change in individuals 17 
involved in leadership roles. 18 
 The National Program Office – the intermediary organization funded by the 19 
Foundation to monitor and assist the sites – was shifted from one university‟s 20 
medical school to another university‟s school of public health. 21 
 The first evaluation team was replaced by the Foundation about two years into the 22 
implementation of the program. 23 
 The Foundation‟s program staff changed:  One of the conceptual originators of 24 
the program retired, one was promoted, and a new program officer was hired. 25 
 The Foundation‟s evaluation director and the evaluation staff initially involved 26 
with Fighting Back left. 27 
 The Foundation president who initiated Fighting Back and selected the first 28 
National Program Office for the program left. 29 
 The membership and leadership of the initiative‟s Natinal Advisory Committee 30 
changed. 31 
 The larger social, political, and policy context in which alcohol and drug use were 32 
being perceived and addressed changed.  Importantly, the community coalition 33 
approach to countering drug abuse became national “demand side” policy, and 34 
law enforcement strategies took a very large number of people involved in drug 35 
activity off the streets. 36 
 The stakeholders in the funded communities, the National Program Office, and 37 
the Foundation learned from their experiences and shifted course in 1996 to more 38 
focused interventions in fewer communities, although the evaluation continued to 39 
collect data in communities that no longer received Foundation funds. 40 
 41 
Missing from the stories of the individuals interviewed for this case is the broader 42 
context of the evaluation field at the time that Fighting Back was initiated, which also 43 
changed between 1988 and 2002:  There were very few examples of credible, successful 44 
evaluations that measured the impacts of community-wide interventions of any type 45 
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when Foundation staff first began thinking about a community anti-drug strategy.
1
  In the 1 
substance abuse field, research was focused on epidemiology, treatment, and costs.  Thus, 2 
Fighting Back was at once an innovation in anti-drug interventions and in evaluation 3 
strategies. 4 
 5 
 6 
THE FOUNDATION TAKES ON SUBSTANCE ABUSE 7 
 8 
 Fighting Back – officially subtitled: Community Initiatives to Reduce Demand for 9 
Illegal Drugs and Alcohol – was the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation‟s first significant 10 
effort in the area of substance abuse.  Prior to 1988, when the first Fighting Back grant 11 
was made to Vanderbilt University to establish the National Program Office for the 12 
initiative, the Foundation had made only three grants related to substance abuse.  The 13 
initial $26.4 million authorized for Fighting Back in 1988 was not only the Foundation‟s 14 
largest program to date, it was at that time “the single largest commitment of private 15 
funds in this country to combat drugs.”2 16 
 17 
 A formal process of task forces and research and expert consultation had been 18 
initiated in 1986 when the Foundation‟s Board of Trustees asked staff to begin exploring 19 
a possible Foundation role in addressing the national problems of substance abuse and 20 
dependence.  Paul Jellinek, currently a Vice President of the Foundation and then one of 21 
the program staff most involved in developing the Fighting Back initiative, describes 22 
these beginnings as occurring in a national atmosphere of fear and sadness, against a 23 
backdrop of drug-related crime, tragedy and death that was immediately visible to people 24 
who lived in poor communities and visible to the rest of the nation through the media.  25 
Smokable crack cocaine was devastating inner city families, shootings over drugs and 26 
drug-dealing territories were making it dangerous to be outside or inside in some 27 
neighborhoods, homelessness and prostitution attributed to addiction, and the detritus of 28 
drug use, were spilling over into the public spaces of towns and cities across the country, 29 
and jails and prisons were filling up with drug users.  In June of 1986, within weeks of 30 
the Foundation Board‟s request for ideas from staff, University of Maryland basketball 31 
star Len Bias died of an apparent overdose of cocaine, just two days after being drafted 32 
by the Boston Celtics, presenting the nation a highly visible example of the 33 
destructiveness of drug use. 34 
 35 
 After more than two years of exploration, analysis and discussion, the staff 36 
prepared a recommendation to the Board (in July 1988) for a national program that would 37 
focus on the demand for illegal drugs and alcohol with the goal of showing that “by 38 
                                               
1  For a discussion of the difficulties involved, see Robinson G. Hollister and Jennifer Hill. 1995. 
“Problems in the Evaluation of Community-wide Initiatives.”  In James P. Connell, Anne C. Kubisch, 
Lizbeth B. Schorr, and Carol H. Weiss (Eds.) New Approaches to Evaluating Community Initiatives: 
Concepts, Methods, and Contexts.  Washington: DC: Aspen Institute (Roundtable on Comprehensive 
Community Initiatives for Children and Families). 
 
2  Steven A. Schroeder, M.D., President and CEO of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, in Annual 
Report 2000, The Challenge of Substance Abuse: Ten Years of Grantmaking, available at www.rwjf.org. 
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pulling together into a single unified effort, communities can begin to solve the pressing 1 
problem of drug and alcohol abuse.”3  The expected outcome was straightforward:  “To 2 
reduce the demand for illegal drugs and alcohol in the funded communities.”  The 3 
specific objectives enumerated were: “To prevent the abuse of drugs and alcohol among 4 
young people, to promote early identification and referral into treatment for those who 5 
have a drug or alcohol problem, to expand the range of available treatment options, and 6 
to ensure post-treatment follow-up to prevent relapse.”4  In other words, a multi-faceted 7 
approach was required. 8 
 9 
 Introducing the thoroughly analytic and services-oriented statement of the 10 
problem and the Foundation‟s proposed response in this 1988 recommendation to the 11 
Board was a statement of a different tenor by then-President Leighton Cluff:  “If the 12 
Board authorizes the suggested program, I believe this Foundation can catalyze a national 13 
movement in which health professionals take a leading role finally to reduce substance 14 
abuse to a minor rather than a major community and national problem.”  The idea that 15 
Fighting Back would “catalyze a national movement” is at the heart of some of the issues 16 
about the Fighting Back national evaluation.  The strategies, processes, successes and 17 
setbacks involved in this aspect of Fighting Back were little documented and were not at 18 
all addressed in the closing years of the national evaluation – to the dismay of some 19 
program stakeholders. 20 
 21 
A suggestion of dual purposes of Fighting Back – which were ultimately 22 
evaluated to differing degrees – can be heard in Paul Jellinek‟s description of the 23 
intellectual journey from the Board‟s 1986 request for staff exploration to a Call for 24 
Proposals issued by the Foundation in the spring of 1989. 25 
 26 
We took two years to get grounded in the field…  There wasn‟t a lot of good data 27 
about effective prevention, treatment or interventions (except for methadone for 28 
heroin addiction).  The focus was on cocaine at that point.  There were therapeutic 29 
communities, but no pharmacologic solutions.  For prevention, there was a 30 
comprehensive school-based curriculum tested in Kansas City called Project 31 
STAR and one called Project ALERT in California that showed modest gains for 32 
marijuana and tobacco, but overall, the evidence base was limited.  It still is and 33 
there still are strongly held views about what works.  The evidence about 34 
treatment was that about one-third of addicts recover, but it takes several tries. 35 
 36 
We cobbled together a list of things that the federal government had not gotten to:  37 
“poly abuse” [abuse of several substances by one person], dual diagnoses [mental 38 
health problems and substance abuse occurring in the same person], maybe 39 
demonstrations, maybe a prevention demonstration, a NIDA-like [National 40 
Institute for Drug Abuse] pharmacologic treatment for cocaine.  But the idea of 41 
being the private tail on the federal dog wasn‟t exciting, and the Board‟s 42 
                                               
3  Summary prepared for the Board of Trustees, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, July 1988. 
 
4  Ibid. 
  6 
injunction had been to find a way the Foundation could make a meaningful 1 
contribution. 2 
 3 
There was a sense of despair about cocaine and crack across the country.  They 4 
were having a profound effect on neighborhoods and social destabilization, 5 
prompting a spectrum of responses from “bring in the National Guard and adopt 6 
martial law” to “legalize it to take out the economic incentives.”  You did have 7 
parent groups mobilizing, active law enforcement, school curricula, prevention 8 
and treatment activity, but there was no coordination or strategy and there was 9 
competition between those who were involved.  This was the opportunity for the 10 
Foundation – to identify a couple of communities that understood their common 11 
problem, could identify their resources, set some priorities, and implement a 12 
strategy. 13 
 14 
We hoped to provide a basis for optimism – that it was not an insoluble problem 15 
that could only be addressed by going to extremes.  It could be solved by doing it 16 
through the democratic institutions. 17 
 18 
 Kathryn Edmundson, who at the beginning of Fighting Back was assistant to John 19 
Brademas, President of New York University and Chairman of the Fighting Back 20 
National Advisory Committee, remembers that there was a “huge question” at the 21 
Foundation – a question not necessarily considered part of the evaluation agenda: Could 22 
you organize to create political will for change at the local level and get it to add up to a 23 
national-level movement?  As she describes the Foundation‟s initial goals, there was an 24 
element of racism and elitism in the prevailing law enforcement/supply side strategies of 25 
the day that Fighting Back was intended to counter.
5
 26 
 27 
 The frame of political values for the Foundation‟s formulation of the Fighting 28 
Back initiative described by Paul Jellinek and Kathryn Edmundson stands alongside the 29 
outcome-oriented language of both the 1988 recommendation to the Board and the 1989 30 
Call for Proposals, which is represented in this list of expected outcomes that appeared in 31 
both documents: 32 
 33 
(1) a measurable and sustained reduction in the initiation of drug and alcohol use 34 
among children and adolescents; 35 
(2) a reduction in drug and alcohol-related deaths and injuries, especially among 36 
children, adolescents, and young adults; 37 
(3) a decline in the prevalence of health problems related to or exacerbated by 38 
alcohol and drug abuse; 39 
(4) a reduction in on-the-job problems and accidents related to alcohol and drugs; 40 
and 41 
                                               
5  Although they state these points more circumspectly, the Foundation‟s key architects of Fighting Back 
confirmed this view publicly.  See Paul S. Jellinek and Ruby P. Hearn.  1991.  “Fighting Drug Abuse at the 
Local Level,” Issues in Science and Technology, Volume VII, Number 4, Washington, DC: National 
Academy of Sciences. 
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(5) a reduction in drug-related crime. 1 
 2 
Paul Jellinek‟s version of the Fighting Back history also emphasizes the 3 
magnitude and unprecedented nature of the undertaking and includes the expectation that 4 
only three or four communities would be able to pull off the Fighting Back approach out 5 
of the originally proposed number of eight implementation grants.  “We believed that if 6 
we could see this in just a handful of places, we would say we had achieved what we had 7 
set out to do.”  Jim Knickman, who was not at the Foundation when Fighting Back was 8 
initially approved by the Board, believes that such a substantial commitment would not 9 
have been made based on this expectation, although the staff did describe their concept to 10 
the Board as a “complex, high-risk undertaking that will require extensive advance 11 
planning by the participating communities.”6 12 
 13 
Ruby Hearn is the person Paul Jellinek means when he talks about the Fighting 14 
Back beginnings in terms of “we.”  Dr. Hearn retired as Senior Vice President of the 15 
Foundation in 2001.  With Jellinek, she was the principal originator of Fighting Back and 16 
involved through late 2000 in decisions about the initiative and the national evaluation.  17 
She confirms Jellinek‟s contention that they told the Foundation Board they “expected a 18 
lot of the sites were not going to make it.”  She emphasized the novelty of the Fighting 19 
Back concept as well and attributed early trouble with the national evaluation to this 20 
feature of the initiative: 21 
 22 
The concept was so novel, we had to ask “What would be the indicators if the 23 
intervention was implemented?  How will we know?”  Initially, the people who 24 
contracted with the evaluators did not understand our goals and expected 25 
outcomes.  The evaluators thought interventions had to be prescriptive – which 26 
was not our view.  In order to have the will in the community, there need to be 27 
locally generated facts and locally generated strategies. 28 
 29 
 In line with this view that community-generated solutions would be most 30 
effective, the Foundation‟s Call for Proposals only specified the broad components of a 31 
multi-faceted strategy – prevention, early identification and referral to treatment, 32 
expanded treatment options, and post-treatment service -- and requirements for two 33 
organizing structures.  Applicants for Fighting Back funding were required to establish 34 
(1) a citizens‟ task force on alcohol and drug abuse to provide oversight, guidance and 35 
support that would represent all groups within the community whose involvement and 36 
commitment would be needed to succeed:  parents, clergy, tenant groups, business and 37 
community leaders, health professionals, school superintendents, principals, judges, 38 
chiefs of police, elected official and others; and (2) a community-wide consortium of all 39 
the institutions, organizations and public and private agencies whose participation is 40 
required to implement the proposed initiative, including news media, civic and religious 41 
organizations, schools, businesses, major health care providers, human service agencies, 42 
drug and alcohol treatment providers and others.  Fighting Back sites would receive one-43 
                                               
6  Summary prepared for the Board of Trustees, op. cit. 
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or two-year planning grants of up to $100,000 per year followed by five-year 1 
implementation grants of $3 million each.  2 
 3 
 In 1990, the Foundation was committed to a major project that, on paper, had 4 
clear goals and clear expected outcomes.  But beyond requirements for components that 5 
were broadly described and new community structures to develop strategies and make 6 
decisions, it was a project that provided grant applicants an unusual amount of flexibility 7 
for how to achieve those goals.  And behind the paper was the conviction that 8 
community-generated solutions based on community-specific facts would be more 9 
effective that Foundation-prescribed solutions.  There was also a sense on the “program 10 
side” of the Foundation that the Fighting Back intervention was being undertaken with 11 
less confidence than suggested by the tone of the official paper, but with a conviction that 12 
it was important for the Foundation to do something in a desperate situation and that the 13 
ultimate undertaking was “political” – to try to shift national anti-drug strategy from a 14 
predominantly supply-reduction approach to a more balanced approach that included 15 
demand reduction efforts.
7
 16 
 17 
 Len Bickman‟s judgment of why Fighting Back could not have succeeded is 18 
rooted in these beginnings, which he calls the “I have an idea” approach to foundation 19 
grantmaking – i.e., grantmaking that is not founded in either theory or research.  20 
According to Dr. Bickman, Fighting Back could not have succeeded because it was based 21 
on a naive and romantic notion of communities: “Just get the people working together 22 
and they‟ll solve it.”  He asked, “Where were the [Fighting Back] communities going to 23 
get the wisdom to do the job?”  At that time, he elaborated, “there were no evidence-24 
based interventions that the community could apply.  They had to discover what worked 25 
in their environment without any theory and without any feedback system that informed 26 
them if some intervention was working.”  As discussed further below, Dr. Bickman 27 
suggested that the initial theory failure was compounded by implementation failure when 28 
the Foundation did little “to help the communities by giving them the tools we knew 29 
worked.” 30 
 31 
 Len Saxe‟s main explanation for the lack of measurable Fighting Back impacts is 32 
rooted in these beginnings as well, although he points first to what changed in the world 33 
in the time it took the Foundation to move from their commitment to an anti-drug effort 34 
to actually fielding an intervention.  During that time, the drug crisis abated somewhat; 35 
the Fighting Back sites became active when the trends in use and abuse, and associated 36 
harms, were already headed down. 37 
 38 
 39 
 40 
 41 
 42 
 43 
                                               
7  The argument for a demand-side approach is presented in Paul S. Jellinek and Ruby P. Hearn.  1991. op. 
cit. 
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RESPONSE TO THE FIGHTING BACK IDEA 1 
 2 
 High Interest 3 
 4 
 The response to the Foundation‟s Call for Proposals was far beyond expectations.  5 
Gregory Dixon, the Deputy Director of the first Fighting Back National Program Office 6 
(NPO), which was charged with managing the review and selection of applicants, reports 7 
that the NPO was told to expect about 125 applications.  This estimate was based, in part, 8 
on the number of U.S. cities that qualified for the grants, which were targeted to 9 
communities having populations of 100,000 to 250,000 persons.  The NPO received 331 10 
applications in September of 1989.  Many were from “communities” defined by the 11 
applicants as parts of cities with populations larger than 250,000 or as multiple 12 
jurisdictions in a region. 13 
 14 
 The program staff of the Foundation took this response as a sign that they had 15 
tapped a reservoir of interest and concern at the community level about drug use and 16 
abuse.
8
  The Foundation Board‟s initial approval of funding was based on an assumption 17 
that 12 planning grants would be awarded and 8 sites would move to implementation – 18 
which had already been increased at the urging of Foundation President Cluff from the 19 
staff‟s plan for 3-4 sites.  The massive response persuaded the Foundation – with the help 20 
of the Fighting Back National Advisory Committee – to award 15 planning grants. 21 
 22 
It took a year to get from the Call for Proposals to the planning grants, a year 23 
during which a very pressured process reduced more than 300 Fighting Back applicants 24 
first to 60 candidates and then to 18 finalists to be visited, and then to 15 grantees.  Greg 25 
Dixon points out that no federal government agency has the ability to spend this much 26 
time planning an initiative, due to the constraints of fiscal year funding.  This was part of 27 
the explanation for why the Fighting Back concept was spread by the federal government 28 
even before it was implemented. 29 
 30 
 Rapid Spread of an Idea 31 
 32 
The high level of interest in Fighting Back funding spawned a much broader 33 
federally-funded effort to build on the Fighting Back initiative.  As Greg Dixon describes 34 
the events, soon after the selection of sites, the new federal Office of National Drug 35 
Control Policy (ONDCP)
9
 encouraged the program staff in the Office of Substance Abuse 36 
Prevention of the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 37 
(SAMHSA) to put together their own Call for Proposals to take advantage of all the work 38 
that had already been done in communities applying for Fighting Back.  A Community 39 
                                               
8  Another Robert Wood Johnson Foundation story peripherally related to the Fighting Back story is about 
the capacity of the Foundation‟s communications division:  According to Greg Dixon, 40,000 copies of the 
Fighting Back Call for Proposals were mailed in February 1989. 
 
9  The ONDCP director of demand reduction was Dr. Herbert Kleber, who became a member of the 
Fighting Back National Advisory Committee and who had been invited, but declined, to head the first 
Fighting Back National Program Office. 
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Substance Abuse Partnership (CSAP) initiative of the federal government subsequently 1 
funded more than 250 programs at about $100,000 per year – all of which were likely to 2 
have first been Fighting Back applicants, according to Greg Dixon. 3 
 4 
Coordinated community-wide interventions for demand reduction are now a 5 
prominent anti-drug strategy employed by the U.S. government generally and ONDCP 6 
specifically.  Approximately $800 million had been spent by the federal government on 7 
the CSAP version of the community coalition anti-drug approach through 1997 and 8 
another $400 million was authorized for a new generation of such community coalition 9 
programs under the Drug-Free Communities initiative of ONDCP.  When Greg Dixon 10 
says that he can count $1 billion in subsequent activities attributed to the Fighting Back 11 
initiative, he means both the CSAP and Drug Free Community Programs of the federal 12 
government.
10
 13 
 14 
Comparison Issues 15 
 16 
 The Fighting Back influence on national anti-drug policy so early in the life of the 17 
initiative caused some difficulty for the national Fighting Back evaluation later.  CSAP 18 
programs were not as richly funded as Fighting Back and emphasized prevention.  19 
Nevertheless, the community-organizing approach to countering drug use and abuse was 20 
so widespread by the mid-1990‟s, when the first Fighting Back evaluation household 21 
survey was fielded, that 17 of the 30 matched comparison sites studied in the Fighting 22 
Back evaluation had CSAP funding.
11
  That meant that drug and alcohol use in Fighting 23 
Back communities was being compared in these instances not to use in communities that 24 
remained in the fragmented condition with respect to anti-drug efforts that Paul Jellinek 25 
and Ruby Hearn identified in the late 1980‟s, but to use in communities that, in many 26 
cases, had similar demand reduction efforts in place. 27 
 28 
The second team of evaluators, led by Len Saxe, attempted to address this issue 29 
both in their design and their analysis.  For example, they included two or three 30 
comparison sites for each Fighting Back site in the national evaluation, in part to 31 
minimize the effect of spreading programs on their ability to detect differences between 32 
the “treatment” communities of the Fighting Back initiative and the comparison sites.  33 
How significant the problem of having CSAP communities as comparison communities 34 
was is a matter of disagreement between the program stakeholders and the evaluation 35 
stakeholders.  The evaluators, for example, do not consider this a problem affecting the 36 
credibility of their results because national data show use of alcohol and illegal drugs 37 
declining everywhere from before Fighting Back got started through 1992 and then 38 
leveling off through the 1990‟s, probably for reasons that had more to do with law 39 
enforcement strategies and the “self-limiting” nature of drug use epidemics than with 40 
                                               
10  Gregory Dixon is now Administrator of the Drug Free Community Programs at ONDCP. 
 
11  Eight of the 14 communities that received Fighting Back planning and implementation grants received 
CSAP grants as well, usually to support the prevention components of their programs.  The fifteenth 
Fighting Back site that received a planning grant but did not go to implementation was San Jose, California. 
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community interventions, whether Fighting Back, CSAP, or other community-coalition 1 
approaches. 2 
 3 
The Fighting Back evaluators also point to the results of an outcome evaluation of 4 
CSAP in support of their findings.  They judge the results of that evaluation as similar to 5 
the results of Fighting Back – i.e., declining use everywhere followed by no significant 6 
measurable change attributable to the interventions, although this is a considerably less 7 
optimistic interpretation of CSAP effects than SAMHSA puts forward.
12
 8 
 9 
 10 
EVALUATION #1:  LOST TIME AND LOST MONEY 11 
 12 
 After a substantial process to identify and select an evaluator for Fighting Back, 13 
the Foundation hired the Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation (PIRE), which had 14 
proposed an outcome evaluation with a dozen separate research projects for $11.5 15 
million.  Although PIRE was eventually fired from the project by Jim Knickman, he does 16 
not fault the initial decision to select this group.  He notes that PIRE was “a reputable 17 
firm, experienced in substance abuse, it was a competitive process, the Principal 18 
Investigator was known to the Foundation, and the evaluation unit had the advice of a 19 
Technical Advisory Committee.  There was no obvious mistake in the hiring.” 20 
 21 
 The first Fighting Back evaluation was ambitious and complex.  It entailed 22 
general population surveys in the Fighting Back sites and in comparison communities, 23 
the development of indicators of community changes, ethnographic work, and site-based 24 
management information systems that would be installed and supported by the 25 
evaluators.  There were questions from the beginning about the fit of PIRE‟s evaluation 26 
design with the Fighting Back intervention.  Greg Dixon remembers that a member of the 27 
Technical Advisory Committee for the evaluation judged the proposed survey “not 28 
sensitive enough” to detect expected changes in alcohol and drug use and he advised that 29 
“if you find changes, you won‟t be able to attribute them to Fighting Back.”  Ruby Hearn 30 
remembers that the Technical Advisory Committee had “lots of issues” about the PIRE 31 
design and “what was measurable.”  Her sense was that “PIRE saw the Fighting Back 32 
evaluation as an opportunity to do all kinds of research.  The PIRE folks came up with 33 
lots of other ways to measure and things to measure because it was too difficult to 34 
measure the outcomes specified by the Foundation in the Call for Proposals.”  Marjorie 35 
Gutman, the Foundation‟s staff member responsible for the Fighting Back evaluation 36 
from its beginning through mid-1997, emphasizes an 18-month period of careful 37 
development of the PIRE evaluation design, the “reasonableness” of which was 38 
confirmed by the fact that the second evaluation team adopted its major features. 39 
 40 
 There was some early unhappiness on the program side of the Foundation about 41 
the evaluation.  Embedded in Ruby Hearn‟s description of the novelty of the Fighting 42 
Back concept is a reference to the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation‟s way of designing 43 
evaluations at the time.  She said, “Initially, the people who contracted with the 44 
                                               
12  Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.  2000.  Prevention Works Through 
Community Partnerships.  Rockville, MD: SAMHSA. 
  12 
evaluators did not understand our goals and expected outcomes.”  The people she meant 1 
were the director and staff of the Foundation‟s evaluation unit.  Dr. Hearn reported that 2 
she and Paul Jellinek did not have a role in hiring the first evaluation team and did not 3 
meet with the first evaluation team to discuss the program‟s objectives.  She remembers 4 
this as intentional and part of the Foundation‟s method at the time of ensuring objective, 5 
independent assessment of its projects.  Dr. Hearn and others referred to this policy of 6 
separation as the “firewall” between “program” and “evaluation.”  The director of 7 
evaluation at the time Fighting Back got under way was reported to have been a firm 8 
believer in the firewall.  (Dr. Hearn noted that this degree of separation between program 9 
and evaluation at the Foundation was not enforced either before or after the tenure of the 10 
evaluation director who initiated the Fighting Back evaluation.  Jim Knickman, in 11 
particular, is known to practice collaboration between the program and evaluation staff 12 
from the beginning of a project so that, according to Dr. Hearn, “the evaluators get the 13 
program objectives right and evaluation contributes” to program learning and decisions.)  14 
 15 
 Marjorie Gutman disagrees with Ruby Hearn about the degree of separation.  She 16 
says that she met with the Foundation‟s program staff several times about their goals and 17 
objectives and that the program staff reviewed evaluation proposals, although they were 18 
not formally a part of the selection team for the first evaluators.  Further, Dr. Gutman 19 
says that the program staff had lots of input to the reconsideration and redesign of the 20 
evaluation after the first evaluator was let go and Len Saxe was assembling a team to take 21 
over the evaluation. 22 
 23 
 There was unhappiness in the field with the early Fighting Back evaluation as 24 
well.  The community sites had been discouraged from creating their own data collection 25 
systems because PIRE was going to provide them data both about their program activities 26 
and about drug and alcohol uses and related harms in their communities.  David 27 
Rosenbloom, the current director of the National Program Office for Fighting Back and a 28 
member of the initiative‟s National Advisory Committee from its inception, identifies the 29 
failure of the local data collection plan as the point when “it may have all started to go 30 
wrong” in the first evaluation.  “The first evaluator was putting someone on the 31 
evaluator‟s payroll sitting full-time in each site collecting process information with a 32 
common software program.  It was a disaster.  The software system never worked, the 33 
sites didn‟t understand it, and because of the way it was presented to them, they treated it 34 
as if it were not their own.”  Jane Callahan, Executive Director of the Vallejo (CA) 35 
Fighting Back Partnership – one of the sites that has been in operation and funded by the 36 
Foundation for the entire 12 years of the initiative so far – underscores the importance of 37 
local data: “Local data is the only data that matters in order to tell your story locally.  38 
Funders – especially local funders – don‟t care about the national story.” 39 
  40 
 The Fighting Back evaluation eventually got away from PIRE, but it took the 41 
Foundation a while to understand this and to put another evaluation team in place.  About 42 
a year into Phase II of the evaluation (the implementation phase of the initiative), 43 
Marjorie Gutman began getting the sense that PIRE was not keeping up with the data 44 
collection and was getting overwhelmed by the magnitude and complexity of the 45 
evaluation.  The Foundation had agreed that PIRE could conduct the general population 46 
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survey of the Fighting Back and comparison communities in-house rather than 1 
subcontracting the work to an experienced survey firm.  This was the fatal error in the 2 
first evaluation, in Jim Knickman‟s view.  According to Dr. Gutman, PIRE had wanted to 3 
get a small, new survey unit up to scale by doing the Fighting Back work in-house, but 4 
“after a year they began to say that they could not do it for the money” they had 5 
originally budgeted.  Gutman agrees that it “was a poor decision on the Foundation‟s part 6 
to let them” conduct the survey.  There had been hints that PIRE was having trouble 7 
because they were not keeping up with “mini-reports” due to the Foundation.  She said 8 
that “PIRE unraveled pretty quickly once they asked for more money.  A year into the 9 
five years of Phase II, everything fell apart.” 10 
 11 
 What falling apart meant in detail was discovered by the second evaluation team 12 
hired by the Foundation.  Leonard Saxe, Principal Investigator for the second team, 13 
described the situation.  “It became apparent that [PIRE‟s evaluation] wasn‟t going 14 
anywhere as indicated by the state of a newspaper analysis from communities reporting 15 
drug abuse.  There were dozens and dozens of boxes filled with newspaper clippings” 16 
that no one had looked at.  For the survey, there were three years of data not analyzed and 17 
“fundamental mistakes” had been made in the survey instrument and sampling plan.  18 
“They didn‟t know where people were located and whether they were actually in Fighting 19 
Back communities.”  The second evaluation team was not able to use any of the survey 20 
data collected by PIRE. 21 
 22 
Major changes were going on at the Foundation while PIRE‟s evaluation work 23 
was going badly.  The evaluation director was “on his way out the door.”  Steven A. 24 
Schroeder, M.D., who became President of the Foundation in July 1990 – in the middle 25 
of the site selection process for Fighting Back – was in the midst of a public relations 26 
crisis generated by the Foundation‟s funding of forums on national health care reform.  27 
(These were seen by some as lobbying support for the Clinton Administration and 28 
Senator Robert Dole attacked both the Foundation and philanthropy in general as a 29 
result.)  At about the same time, Schroeder brought in Jim Knickman to head Research 30 
and Evaluation at the Foundation. 31 
 32 
These leadership changes would be important to the next stage of the Fighting 33 
Back evaluation.  Dr. Schroeder was known as a person interested in results and the 34 
bottom line.  His best-known research was a cost analysis of chronic illness that showed 35 
that the last year of life of chronically ill people was the most expensive in terms of 36 
health care.  According to Kathryn Edmundson, Dr. Schroeder and the former President 37 
Lee Cluff could not have been more different; Schroeder considered community 38 
programs “squishy.”  Len Saxe reports that Schroeder called himself “the most skeptical 39 
person in the building” about Fighting Back.  Knickman was just as different from his 40 
predecessor.  One indicator of his commitment to collaborative relationships between the 41 
evaluation and program sides of the Foundation was the process for selecting the Fighting 42 
Back evaluation team that replaced PIRE:  Dr. Leonard Saxe and his team were chosen 43 
by a consensus of the evaluation and program staff most involved. 44 
 45 
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Within a few months of coming to the Foundation, Jim Knickman – alerted by 1 
Marjorie Gutman -- had gotten a handle on the problems at PIRE and terminated their 2 
work on the Fighting Back evaluation.  At that point, 14 sites had been in an 3 
implementation mode for almost two years, following a two-year planning period -- 4 
without data support from the evaluator and without initiative-wide baseline measures of 5 
the drug and alcohol problem.  The failed first evaluation had cost the initiative four 6 
years, and $4.6 million had been spent for PIRE‟s work, virtually none of which was 7 
usable by the second evaluation team, according to Len Saxe.  Both of these would turn 8 
out to matter to the credibility of the second evaluation.  Ruby Hearn said that, after the 9 
Foundation‟s “generosity to PIRE,” she had to “fight for every nickel for the evaluation” 10 
and “a lot of the decisions [about the second evaluation] were driven by cost.” 11 
 12 
In this four-year, $4.6 million gap lies much of the division between Fighting 13 
Back stakeholders.  “Program” stakeholders question whether the evaluation missed 14 
changes that might have occurred in the community sites between 1992/3 when they 15 
received their implementation grants and 1995, when survey data on alcohol and drug use 16 
were first collected by the new evaluation team.  The second evaluation team and the 17 
Foundation evaluation staff argue that the analysis of differences between comparison 18 
sites and Fighting Back sites on measures of alcohol and substance abuse and use, and the 19 
secular trends of declining use everywhere, are more important.  Nevertheless, because it 20 
was intended to measure outcomes, the Fighting Back national evaluation is vulnerable to 21 
criticism on this point.  People who are unhappy about the evaluators‟ “no impact” 22 
conclusion hope that the evaluation design will not bear the scrutiny of peer review, in 23 
part for lack of a pre-initiative baseline.  If he could do it all over, Len Saxe “would have 24 
pushed harder [on the difference between the initiative goals and the sites‟ activities] and 25 
gotten involved earlier.”  (He was acting as a consultant to the first evaluator before he 26 
was invited to take over the evaluation.)  If this had happened, he says, “no one would 27 
have been able to complain about the baseline and there wouldn‟t have been so much 28 
residue [from the failed first evaluation].” 29 
 30 
 31 
FIGHTING BACK IN THE FIELD: A 1996 WATERSHED 32 
 33 
 A resounding theme heard from Fighting Back program stakeholders is about a 34 
1996 watershed.  Before 1996, 14 Fighting Back sites were pursuing unique local anti-35 
drug strategies, widely varying in emphasis.  This was the Fighting Back described as “a 36 
thousand flowers blooming,” and “do your own thing.”  Greg Dixon asserts that the first 37 
National Program Office “hammered prevention, early intervention, treatment and 38 
aftercare,” which were the underpinnings of a comprehensive strategy specified by the 39 
Foundation staff.  However, most people interviewed for this case emphasize the 40 
variation across the sites in the 1992-1996 period in terms of local goals and strategies. 41 
 42 
Before 1996, the National Program Office was located at the Vanderbilt 43 
University Medical School under the direction of Anderson Spickard, Jr., M.D.  After 44 
1996, eight of the 14 Fighting Back sites were re-funded to implement much more 45 
focused anti-drug strategies that emphasized treatment and the National Program Office 46 
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was moved to the Boston University School of Public Health, specifically, to another 1 
Foundation-funded program called Join Together, under the direction of David 2 
Rosenbloom, Ph.D.
13
 3 
 4 
Two key events stimulated these changes.  The first was the looming 1997 end of 5 
Fighting Back as originally envisioned.  The Foundation‟s program staff – principally 6 
Ruby Hearn and Paul Jellinek – had decided to recommend to the Foundation Board of 7 
Trustees that Fighting Back should be given more time, but they needed persuasive 8 
arguments why the Foundation should invest even more in what was already a very large 9 
project showing no effects.  The second event was this initial finding of “no effects” from 10 
Len Saxe‟s evaluation team.  Based on the first wave of a household survey conducted in 11 
the spring of 1995 in 12 of the Fighting Back communities, the evaluators found that on 12 
measures of seven substance abuse behaviors, “all of the estimates of the Fighting Back 13 
effects are approximately equal to zero, which indicates that, on average, Fighting Back 14 
sites are not significantly different from the control sites.”14  The evaluators‟ 15 
interpretation of this finding in their interim report to the Foundation
15
 was not so much a 16 
call to action as a reminder that, from the evaluation perspective, Fighting Back was just 17 
getting started.  “Final Comments” included in that report, in full, were: 18 
 19 
The preliminary analysis of survey and indicator data reported here suggest that, 20 
at mid-implementation, Fighting Back has not had a demonstrable effect on 21 
patterns of alcohol and illicit drug use.  Nevertheless, our analysis of the survey 22 
data indicates that there are some detectable differences in how individuals in 23 
Fighting Back communities perceive their neighborhoods.  More importantly, 24 
analyses of the survey data validate some of the central assumptions underlying 25 
the development of the initiative.  Our data make clear that alcohol and illicit drug 26 
use remain serious problems that affect a wide number of individuals.  Further, 27 
our analyses suggest that substance abuse is not merely an individual problem, but 28 
is associated with a “social system” and neighborhood.  Whether Fighting Back, 29 
through the development of community coalitions, can change these patterns will 30 
take longer to assess.  It seems clear, however, that the Fighting Back strategy is 31 
addressing the issues identified by the present research.
16
 32 
 33 
 Later, the Fighting Back implementation research would raise questions about 34 
whether, how and to what degree the community strategies were, indeed, addressing the 35 
                                               
13  Fighting Back was first Foundation initiative to have a National Program Office that was not headed by 
a medical doctor. 
 
14  See L. Saxe, E. Reber, D. Hallfors, C. Kadushin, D. Jones, D. Rindskopf, and A. Beveridge.  “Think 
Globally, Act Locally:  Assessing the Impact of Community-Based Substance Abuse Prevention.”  
Evaluation and Program Planning, Vol. 20, No.3, pp. 357-366, 1997. 
 
15  L. Saxe, E. Reber, C. Kadushin, A. Beveridge, M. Larson and D. Rindskopf.  Fighting Back Evaluation: 
Interim Report.  November 22, 1995. 
 
16  Ibid., p. 66. 
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basic issues of alcohol and drug use and abuse, and the environmental conditions and 1 
social and neighborhood systems that surrounded individual choices about use.  But, at 2 
the point of the first survey in 1995, the data collection to support judgments about 3 
implementation had just begun. 4 
 5 
While the Fighting Back people in the field, and those helping them, knew that 6 
reductions in use of alcohol and illicit drugs were the ultimate goals of their work, the 7 
actual measurement of their accomplishments using this standard was a surprise and 8 
disappointment for many.  Within the Foundation, the “no difference” finding in late 9 
1995 provided the rationale for making some changes in the field that were long 10 
considered necessary.  As Ruby Hearn describes the reason for change,  11 
 12 
We had been asking for logic models [detailing how site activities would logically 13 
produce the initiative outcomes].  At some point we realized that the National 14 
Program Office was not able to help the [Fighting Back] communities be 15 
strategic.  They had great difficulties being hard-nosed enough to make the 16 
communities be strategic.  They had been “co-opted” by the marvelous human 17 
dimension of what was happening. 18 
 19 
 Others had sharper views of the changes.  Paul Jellinek says that former 20 
Foundation President Lee Cluff selected Dr. Spickard for this role without input from the 21 
Foundation‟s program staff, implying that this would not have been the program staff‟s 22 
choice, and Kathryn Edmundson says that the first National Program Office had been a 23 
weakness in the initiative from the start that the National Advisory Committee tried to 24 
compensate for with their own active involvement, but ultimately could not.  David 25 
Anderson, of the second National Program Office, says that the first NPO had no 26 
experience working with communities or with a community public health model of 27 
services – which was implicit in the Fighting Back initiative.  Len Bickman says that Dr. 28 
Spickard, head of the first National Program Office, had a commitment to helping 29 
communities fight drug and alcohol abuse, but the NPO was like the Foundation in that 30 
“there was no underlying theory and body of scientific evidence to support the concept.” 31 
 32 
 The Second National Program Office 33 
 34 
 In 1996, the Foundation moved the National Program Office for the Fighting 35 
Back initiative from the Vanderbilt University Medical School and the Spickard-Dixon 36 
team to the Boston University School of Public Health/Join Together team at the same 37 
time the decision was made to extend Fighting Back, but to reduce the number of sites 38 
eligible for new funding, requiring a tighter focus on strategies that arguably could reduce 39 
measurable alcohol and drug use.  The purpose was to get greater leverage for change on 40 
the measures that were being used in the national evaluation.  As David Rosenbloom, the 41 
Join Together/NPO director, described the shift, the directive to sites for the second 42 
implementation phase was to “go back and examine the most important substance abuse 43 
issues in their communities that they could do something about at some scale that would 44 
be measurable at the community level.”  In contrast to the first NPO team, who have been 45 
described by most stakeholders, including themselves, as cheerleaders, coaches and 46 
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“nurturing,” Rosenbloom and his deputy Janice Ford Griffin, were called “hard-nosed,”  1 
“demanding” and “always raising the bar.” 2 
 3 
Eight Fighting Back sites were invited to re-apply for three additional years of 4 
funding based on new strategic plans setting benchmarks for achievements that, if met, 5 
would trigger another two years of funding.  For these plans, the “denominator problem” 6 
was a critical driver – i.e., identifying the population of users that had to be impacted in 7 
order to produce a reduction detectable by the national evaluation.  Increasing treatment 8 
and treatment capacity was an important goal. 9 
 10 
 Floyd Morris was the new program officer for Fighting Back at the 1996 11 
watershed.  It became his role, along with the staff of the new NPO, to “sit with the sites 12 
and have them look at prevalence rates to understand how much they would have to do” 13 
in order to have the impact they intended.  This kind of “denominator exercise” has paid 14 
off for the Foundation in a subsequent urban health initiative and an after school project, 15 
according to Morris.  A key lesson from the post-1996 phase of Fighting Back was about 16 
how to help community sites focus on data to pinpoint problems, develop a theory-based 17 
strategy to impact the problem, and track how they are doing. 18 
 19 
Two other before-and-after-1996 stories that give a sense of the watershed come 20 
from Greg Dixon and Jane Callahan, Executive Director of Vallejo (CA) Fighting Back. 21 
   22 
Greg Dixon:  In the early days, there was no talk of evidence-based programs,
17
 23 
no talk of theories of change.  There were model programs (like STAR) and a 24 
much greater sense of “build it from the ground up with the best advice 25 
available.”  The National Program Office was much more agnostic than now on 26 
what will work in communities.  To answer the question “How are you going to 27 
reduce drug use and improve systems that care for people with addictions?” the 28 
notion was to look at sources of alarm, such as pregnant drug users, the 29 
devastating effects of alcohol. 30 
 31 
Jane Callahan:  We embarked [on Fighting Back] thinking there was a lot of 32 
flexibility.  It wasn‟t clear until we settled on a household survey – that became 33 
the litmus test later in the project – that the flexibility wasn‟t going to be reflected 34 
in the national evaluation…We adjusted interventions to match the data from the 35 
household survey.  If the highest rates of consumption are among males age 18-36 
24, then it stands to reason that you could reduce use by targeting your 37 
interventions to this group...The second NPO was totally focused on getting 38 
people into treatment – the percent of chemically-dependent people in treatment 39 
as an outcome.  This was the thinking about how to reduce use in the short term. 40 
 41 
 42 
 43 
 44 
                                               
17  This is now a standard for discretionary funding in many federal government programs, including those 
funded by SAMHSA. 
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EVALUATION #2:  RELYING ON SURVEY DATA 1 
 2 
 Almost everyone involved in Fighting Back agrees that Len Saxe‟s team rescued 3 
the national evaluation from a major meltdown.  The consensus judgment is that the 4 
second evaluation team did a credible job in very difficult circumstances.  But not 5 
everyone agrees with the decisions made after the rescue.  The fact that PIRE spent $4.6 6 
million with little to show put the Foundation‟s Fighting Back program and evaluation 7 
staff in the position of moving forward without replacement dollars.  Some of the key 8 
decisions about the second evaluation were “tough choices” in the circumstances of 9 
limited resources. 10 
 11 
 In its ambition and broad design, the second evaluation was not so different from 12 
the first, according to Marjorie Gutman, although Len Saxe described it as much simpler 13 
than the PIRE plan -- for example, because Saxe‟s team scrapped an analysis of 14 
newspaper coverage of drug issues.  Dr. Saxe‟s team -- initially based at the Graduate 15 
School and University Center of the City University of New York and then at the Heller 16 
School of Social Welfare and Management at Brandeis University -- proposed a 17 
household survey in Fighting Back and comparison communities to measure alcohol and 18 
drug use, dependency, and awareness of treatment facilities and some features of the 19 
environment; an MIS-based data collection effort to identify and analyze the activities of 20 
the sites; ethnographic studies to document how each of the communities went about 21 
accomplishing the common goals; and development of community indicators of alcohol 22 
and drug-related harms.  The basic idea was, first, to be able to say whether drug and 23 
alcohol use declined in Fighting Back communities, and second, to be able to attribute 24 
changes to what the sites did.  One major difference between the PIRE design and the 25 
Saxe team‟s design was that PIRE had proposed only one comparison site for each 26 
Fighting Back site to be surveyed while the Saxe team proposed two or three per program 27 
site.  Four research questions identified by the evaluation team were:
18
 28 
 29 
 How successfully was Fighting Back implemented? 30 
 Was the demand for alcohol and drugs reduced? 31 
 Was harm due to alcohol and drug abuse reduced? 32 
 To what extent did the project generate fundamental and sustainable system 33 
change? 34 
 35 
Over time, the national evaluation stopped collecting and analyzing site activities, 36 
ethnographic data and community indicators, leaving only the household survey and its 37 
outcome measures as the core evaluation.  Some of the reasons for this paring back are 38 
technical and fiscal, when explained by the evaluation‟s Principal Investigator.  But Dr. 39 
Saxe also says that the evaluators did not have any idea when they first got involved how 40 
long the Fighting Back initiative and evaluation would go on.  They never planned on a 41 
decade or more of work. 42 
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Fighting Back Evaluation Mid-Project Report (Draft), August 30, 1996. 
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 1 
 The decision to end the ethnographic work in the sites that had been led by 2 
Professor Delmos Jones was relatively straightforward:  Dr.  Jones fell ill and was not 3 
able to continue after 1996.  (He died after a long illness in 1999.)  His work was not 4 
picked up by someone else because there were fewer funded sites after 1996 (although 5 
not all of the eight that continued to receive funding in the second implementation phase 6 
of the initiative had been studied by the ethnographers).  Also, because producing the 7 
Community Studies took several years, the Foundation and evaluators agreed that 8 
resources were better spent elsewhere.  Dr. Saxe reports that the evaluators had learned 9 
what they needed to know about community coalition processes, particularly to explain 10 
why they are problematic. 11 
 12 
The MIS component of the evaluation was only been intended to operate through 13 
the first implementation phase of the initiative.  It was substantially revised between an 14 
early analysis of the MIS data published in 1997 and a final look at implementation data 15 
for Fighting Back published in 2002.
19
  But, the MIS component was “an imperfect 16 
analysis,” according to Dr. Saxe.  “In the absence of a road map for the program,” the 17 
evaluators were not successful in linking either how Fighting Back money was spent to 18 
site outcomes – possibly because local Fighting Back funding was mostly dedicated to 19 
community organizing activities -- or how the broader slate of site activities was related 20 
to outcomes. 21 
 22 
Although this was potentially rich territory because site-by-site there was great 23 
variation both in the outcomes and in Fighting Back strategies, Paul Jellinek‟s assessment 24 
was that the early implementation analysis by the evaluation team only added to the 25 
difficulties of understanding the relationships in Fighting Back.  According to Jellinek, 26 
the communities with the strongest interventions had the weakest changes in alcohol and 27 
drug use, dependence and attitudes. 28 
 29 
It was difficult to trace the direct effects of the interventions because the bulk of 30 
the funds [less than $1 million annually] went to staffing for community change 31 
operations – trying to leverage change by getting providers, law enforcement, 32 
education institutions to change the way they did business.  Without much 33 
funding to follow the trail and understand the dynamic, [the 1997 implementation] 34 
analysis doesn‟t hang together.  You can‟t really understand what the 35 
interventions were. 36 
 37 
 The most recent analysis of Fighting Back implementation
20
 clarifies the lack of 38 
connection between site strategies and site outcomes, but does not support the Fighting 39 
Back approach.  There were “strong and consistent negative correlations between 40 
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strategies and outcomes,” producing these lessons, according to the implementation 1 
researchers: 2 
 3 
First, broad goals do not lend themselves to effects on specific outcomes.  4 
Fighting Back had extremely broad goals to reduce demand for all drugs and 5 
alcohol among all groups and to prevent harms associated with use.  Such broad 6 
goals required communities to work on many fronts at once and to have many 7 
competing programmatic priorities. 8 
 9 
Second, coalitions are expensive to maintain and may not lend themselves to 10 
effective or well-implemented strategies.  RWJF required coalitions to have 11 
broad-based involvement, including grassroots members as well as community 12 
elites.  Money and strategy concessions were required to keep people at the 13 
coalition table. Demand reductions were not necessarily served well by these 14 
requirements.
21
 15 
 16 
 As noted below, the last word has not yet been written about the connection 17 
between implementation strategies and impacts in Fighting Back, but the implementation 18 
evaluators‟ inability to find correlations between what the initiative sites did to changes 19 
in alcohol and drug use and abuse was an early sign to the evaluation team that the 20 
overall strategy was ineffective. 21 
 22 
The decision to discontinue work on community indicators was somewhat more 23 
complicated.  A Community Indicators Team of the national evaluation compiled data 24 
from public records and databases for 12 of the 14 Fighting Back sites to track changes in 25 
“harms” caused by the use and abuse of alcohol and drugs.22  Harms, rather than use per 26 
se, were often the focus of the Fighting Back community coalition activities and were 27 
prominent in the list of expected Fighting Back outcomes that appeared in the Foundation 28 
staff‟s 1988 recommendation to the Board and the 1989 Call for Fighting Back proposals. 29 
 30 
Community indicators were also intended as intermediate outcomes for the 31 
evaluation, meant to signal in the short-term the direction of changes in measures of use, 32 
dependency and attitude that were expected to take longer.  As described by the 33 
evaluators, community indicators also compensate for some of the problems of telephone 34 
surveying about drug use.  They “are records of negative encounters with the criminal 35 
justice or other community systems…[that] provide measures of harm that are less likely 36 
to be confounded by factors of phone availability or self-presentation…they provide an 37 
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additional source of data with which to triangulate on substance use and harm.”  Key 1 
issues for this component of the national Fighting Back evaluation were that, in order to 2 
be useful, indicators had to be comparable from community to community as well as 3 
valid, based on reliable, accessible data, and feasible to construct.
23
 4 
 5 
 It turned out that the major indicators considered for the evaluation did not satisfy 6 
these conditions.  As reported by Len Saxe, the principal data sources that were 7 
comparable and reliable did not yield useful indicators:  Arrests were not good indicators 8 
because effective Fighting Back efforts could increase arrests, so it would not be clear 9 
whether increases or decreases were desirable; the numbers of alcohol-involved fatal auto 10 
accidents were too few at a community level to reliably indicate changes from year to 11 
year; and hospitalization indicators were questionable because few of the Fighting Back 12 
sites had established relationships with hospital service (and, once again, it would not be 13 
clear whether increases or decreases were desirable).  School survey data became 14 
difficult to use because of rules about informed consent and the unwillingness of the 15 
survey research group that had a 20-year national school survey sample to identify 16 
schools in Fighting Back communities. 17 
 18 
Len Saxe convened a meeting of the Fighting Back evaluation‟s Technical 19 
Advisory Committee to discuss these issues.  The expert view on that committee, with 20 
which Jim Knickman agreed, was that while most of the problems could be worked out, it 21 
would take a long time, it would require more resources, and many of the indicators 22 
would still be open to interpretation.  Dr. Saxe “did not want to do something that 23 
couldn‟t be done well,” he said, so the Foundation and the evaluators agreed to drop the 24 
community indicators.  Saxe also believed that “David Rosenbloom‟s emphasis on 25 
treatment made the community indicators less important.”  David Rosenbloom, on the 26 
other hand, believes that Saxe‟s Community Indicators Team had been committed to an 27 
unnecessarily strict standard for developing indicators to fit the boundaries of the 28 
Fighting Back communities, a standard that became impossible to work with.  Len 29 
Bickman, who has had experience with such community indicators, believes that the 30 
problems were insurmountable because the indicators “are insensitive to change, or they 31 
don‟t match the data that you can get, or the data don‟t match the geographic areas that 32 
you‟re studying.” 33 
 34 
 The loss of the community indicators effort in the national evaluation has affected 35 
sites differently because of their varying effectiveness in developing their own local 36 
indicators.  In Vallejo, for example, the site leaders asked for and received what they 37 
considered useful local data from the national evaluators and have succeeded in 38 
developing their own systems for tracking several indicators.  In contrast, the San 39 
Antonio Fighting Back site has not developed local alternatives to the national evaluation 40 
data and the Board Chair of that site, Willie Mitchell, expects to pay a price for relying 41 
on the national evaluation.  At the final meeting of the Fighting Back National Advisory 42 
Committee in March 2002, he said, “I have to use the data that is given to me [by the 43 
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national evaluation] to raise money locally even if the national picture is not supporting 1 
the local situation.”  Morris also made an impassioned plea for recognition that there is 2 
local knowledge of what has been accomplished that is not consistent with the national 3 
evaluation findings.  He suggested that, in the end, this quandary will be resolved locally: 4 
“San Antonio will develop its own story.  We can‟t say that it did not work.” 5 
 6 
 7 
EVALUATION #2:  THE PRICE OF RELYING ON SURVEY DATA 8 
 9 
 The Residue of Distrust 10 
 11 
The decisions that led to survey data collection as the sole evaluation strategy 12 
after 1996 left their own residue.  Not only did some community representatives feel that 13 
their accomplishments in harm reductions were not being recognized, they anticipated 14 
that their participation in the evaluation would ultimately cost them support.  Jane 15 
Callahan suggested at the final meeting of the National Advisory Committee, a little 16 
facetiously but with great seriousness nevertheless that 17 
 18 
the community has been the „human subject‟ in the evaluation and it would be 19 
good to have informed consent [the next time] – information about what it means 20 
to study the community – now that we‟re dealing with the fallout of being studied, 21 
trying to get funding to keep the programs going. 22 
 23 
She meant that the sites had unknowingly taken a risk by participating in Fighting Back 24 
and its evaluation. 25 
 26 
 David Rosenbloom, who was a member of the Fighting Back National Advisory 27 
Committee from the beginning and participated in the site selection process before 28 
heading the second National Program Office, observed that the sites‟ wariness about the 29 
evaluation is not a recent development. 30 
 31 
They felt betrayed by PIRE because they were promised data and never got 32 
anything.  And they never understood at the beginning – or through the first seven 33 
years – that the “final exam” was going to have just these three questions on it. 34 
 35 
He meant that the only measures of the sites‟ accomplishments for the national evaluation 36 
would be reductions in alcohol and drug use, increased awareness of treatment and 37 
prevention, and positive changes in the substance use environment – the three main 38 
categories of measures for the household surveys conducted in 1995, 1997, and 1999. 39 
 40 
Paul Jellinek does not believe the claim on behalf of the sites that “nobody told us 41 
what was on the final.”  He says, “Nobody could have missed it.  It was in the name of 42 
the program [Community Initiatives to Reduce Demand for Illegal Drugs and Alcohol].”  43 
Ronda Zakocs, a senior research advisor for Join Together, observed that “everyone knew 44 
Fighting Back was about use reduction, but the belief was that was in five years; there 45 
was no urgency and no scale.”  Penny Jenkins, director of the Santa Barbara Fighting 46 
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Back project, told the final meeting of the National Advisory Committee:  “We knew all 1 
along that reduction of alcohol and drug use was the objective, but many other things 2 
happened.  It would be good to know about those.” 3 
 4 
 The decision to drop the Fighting Back evaluation‟s community indicators was 5 
also made in the context of expectations about what was going to be learned – 6 
particularly, whether outcomes or implementation was the most important story.  While 7 
the evaluators were focused on outcomes, drawn from survey data, there was a 8 
widespread belief among the “program side” Fighting Back stakeholders that another 9 
story could be told, one that would validate their efforts and their experiences.  The fact 10 
that the national evaluation offered no alternative to the outcomes perspective – and, 11 
specifically, no alternative to the findings that Fighting Back did not reduce alcohol and 12 
drug use – was a source of some distress and anger. 13 
 14 
The high emotions surrounding the “bottom line” impact analysis emerged in 15 
accusations.  Some stakeholders accused Len Saxe‟s evaluation team of having gone into 16 
the project with their minds already made up.  Paul Jellinek reported that “Len Saxe was 17 
skeptical from the get go and Charlie Kadushin [Senior Co-investigator on the second 18 
evaluation team] was openly skeptical.  Greg Dixon also said that Kadushin predicted that 19 
the evaluation would find no effects.  Len Bickman‟s view is that accusations of bias are 20 
unfair but typical in the circumstance.  Laura Leviton, a senior evaluation staffer in the 21 
Foundation reporting to Jim Knickman, notes that the standard of ethics to which 22 
evaluators are supposed to adhere requires them to point out potential problems in the 23 
interventions to be evaluated. 24 
 25 
 Where some program stakeholders in Fighting Back saw bias, others saw the 26 
evaluators giving their best professional advice on whether an evaluation would yield the 27 
expected good news.  In this vein, Ruby Hearn reported that “Len Saxe had a strong prior 28 
that the concept of community-wide coalitions as a strategy was flawed,” but she also 29 
said that he was “driven by the desire to do something useful for a hardworking 30 
community [the substance abuse community].  He didn‟t want to spend millions of 31 
dollars and find nothing.”  Dr. Saxe describes an early meeting of the second evaluation 32 
team with the Foundation staff in which “We said we doubted whether there would be a 33 
significant effect given what we know about the changes in the communities.” 34 
 35 
Seth Emont, who succeeded Marjorie Gutman as the Research and Evaluation 36 
project officer for the Fighting Back evaluation, gave the notion of Saxe‟s “prior” a 37 
somewhat different interpretation.  He said that “Len Saxe wanted to do these surveys 38 
because the programs were introduced in order to change drug use; he was not so 39 
invested in implementation.” 40 
 41 
 Another take on the evaluators‟ expectations and priors – articulated by Len 42 
Bickman, for example -- is that Fighting Back lacked a strong underlying theory of 43 
change that connected community coalitions and their activities to the decisions of 44 
individuals to use drugs and alcohol; the evaluators set out to either find such a 45 
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connection or demonstrate that community coalitions were not the way to go.  Len Saxe 1 
admits to disbelief, but the way he puts it is: 2 
 3 
The bottom line from the evaluation of Fighting Back and other programs like it is 4 
that grassroots community coalitions don‟t produce health benefits.  All the 5 
community has to do is identify the problem and let the experts come in, rather 6 
than having the community develop the program. 7 
 8 
Greg Dixon concurs:  “Len Saxe has correctly pointed out that there are very few health 9 
problems solved by community activists.  The concept of a collective approach 10 
empowered neighborhood people over expertise – which is valid for some issues, but not 11 
for substance abuse.” 12 
 13 
 Implementation Analysis:  The Evaluation’s Ability to Explain 14 
 15 
The Fighting Back initiative and its evaluation illustrate an all too familiar but 16 
central problem for evaluation: what to do with a no-effect conclusion.  When 17 
evaluations find conclusions of no effect, decisionmakers can legitimately ask 18 
whether the flaw lies with the original theory or assumptions behind the program; 19 
the implementation of the program; or the ability of evaluation measurement to 20 
sensitively detect relevant change that has indeed occurred. 21 
 22 
     Laura Leviton 23 
Senior Program Officer (Research and 24 
Evaluation) 25 
     Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 26 
 27 
 Dr. Leviton provides an explanation for some of the disagreement about what 28 
actually happened in the Fighting Back initiative and whether the evaluation “missed” 29 
either local accomplishments or a type of learning that would have advanced the field:  30 
Dr. Saxe initially wanted to undertake a more extensive implementation analysis but the 31 
Foundation would not pay for it.  She said, 32 
 33 
In general, the Foundation focuses on outcome evaluations and may underfund 34 
the type of evaluation that could inform us as to why the initiative did not “work.” 35 
 36 
And further: 37 
 38 
[T]he preoccupation with assessing outcomes [of Fighting Back] has so far 39 
precluded a careful study of implementation or the community processes that 40 
might lead to insight about successful variation. 41 
 42 
Dr. Saxe‟s evaluation team has not yet written a final report that draws together 43 
their understanding of the activities of the Fighting Back sites and the results of the 44 
impact analysis based on survey data to explain whether the “no impact” findings were 45 
the result of implementation failure or theory failure or something else.  The component 46 
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of the evaluation that analyzed the site activities was significantly revised after an initial 1 
publication in 1997.
24
  Consistent with the final analysis, many of the stakeholders in the 2 
Fighting Back initiative and evaluation would agree that the activities of the local sites 3 
were neither of the type nor strength to affect the measures employed by the national 4 
evaluation to judge Fighting Back‟s effects.  Nevertheless, at least one more chapter in 5 
the Fighting Back story is needed to understand whether the evaluation will offer lessons 6 
about what was done locally, how it contributed to the evaluation bottom line, how, in the 7 
evaluators‟ view better results might be obtained, or how the bottom line might be more 8 
appropriately determined. 9 
 10 
Jim Knickman‟s version of the disconnect between expectations of the evaluators 11 
and expectations of the sites about what was to be learned is:  “The sites said clearly that 12 
the Foundation had the wrong goals; we needed shorter term goals.”  This is in line with 13 
the observation by Penny Jenkins at the final Fighting Back National Advisory 14 
Committee meeting:  “What should have been evaluated was social change.  The 15 
competitive culture of the Fighting Back initiative made it unlikely that the sites would 16 
share their knowledge and it produced variation in strategies.  Evaluating drug and 17 
alcohol use was not the thing to do initially.” 18 
 19 
 20 
EVALUATION #2:  MEASURING AND INTERPRETING OUTCOMES 21 
 22 
There may have been more to learn through a different type of implementation 23 
analysis: The loss of the community indicators research, an incomplete set of Community 24 
Studies, and no evaluation effort to examine post-1996 site activities left many 25 
stakeholders wondering and worrying about the national evaluation.  But, at the heart of 26 
disagreements about the Fighting Back evaluation is interpretation of the research using 27 
survey data.  There are key disagreements about the remaining piece of the evaluation 28 
that focus on the use of these data.  First, there is disagreement about whether Fighting 29 
Back should be judged a success or failure by looking at the aggregate effects of all 12 30 
sites in the survey sample.  The answer depends, in part, on whether the Foundation set 31 
out to test a model for reducing drug and alcohol use or whether the Foundation set out to 32 
find models.  Ruby Hearn and Paul Jellinek have two versions of the same answer.  Dr. 33 
Hearn said: 34 
 35 
It was never the program intention that the findings should be summed across 36 
sites because there was not a prescribed intervention with common features, only 37 
similar approaches.  We intended to look at these community by community.  We 38 
needed to look at several -- we decided on eight, originally – to do enough to 39 
make sure that somebody can succeed and that there would be enough successes 40 
to be policy relevant. 41 
 42 
 43 
 44 
 45 
                                               
24  The published version of the final implementation analysis appears in Denise Hallfors, et al., op. cit. 
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 Paul Jellinek described the early thinking about the evaluation in this way: 1 
 2 
What were we interested in?  Restoring a sense of optimism.  There were no 3 
models and we expected only three or four communities to pull this off…  4 
Fighting Back was a different deal [than previous Foundation initiatives that 5 
evaluated the replication of health services models with the idea of influencing 6 
federal legislation.]   We were trolling to see if any models would emerge….We 7 
wanted to get communities to engage in a process…We were measuring to see if 8 
there was a significant difference in substance abuse health and social 9 
consequences.  We wanted to look community by community to see if any are 10 
able to turn around the substance abuse problem because the goal was to show 11 
that turnaround was possible without bringing in the National Guard or legalizing 12 
drugs. 13 
 14 
 The national evaluation did, in fact, sum the survey results across the 12 sites 15 
surveyed as well as provide some site-specific impacts.  The 1999 cross-site findings 16 
included significant reductions on one of nine measures of substance use (the proportion 17 
of respondents considered alcohol dependent based on their consumption); significant 18 
positive effects on the basis of three of five measures of treatment and prevention 19 
awareness; and one significant change in the wrong direction on six measures of the 20 
substance use environment.  One explanation for doing the cross-site analysis is resource 21 
limitations.  Paul Jellinek describes a compromise on allocating evaluation resources that 22 
led to the cross-site approach: 23 
 24 
We had to make choices.  One option was to reduce the survey sample and 25 
continue to look in some other ways, but we would lose the ability to look one by 26 
one and a whole-sample evaluation would wash out the [individual] community 27 
successes.  We kept the sample large enough [to detect individual community 28 
effects], but there is not as much information as we originally wanted. 29 
 30 
The result of the compromise was that there would have to be moderate to large effects at 31 
the site level to be detectable and significant effects at more than two sites on a single 32 
outcome measure in order for the result to be detectable in the cross-site analysis; site-33 
level changes in discrete low-prevalence substance use (such as cocaine) would not be 34 
detectable. 35 
 36 
Jellinek was not happy with the analysis resulting from the compromise.  A 37 
second area of disagreement was the presentation of the survey results. 38 
 39 
How to define success was a real issue for the evaluation.  Ruby Hearn and I were 40 
looking for a couple of sites but Len aggregated data to determine impacts of a 41 
model and found only [a cross-site] reduction in use by alcoholics [the measure of 42 
alcohol dependency].  This went from 4 percent to 3 percent, but instead of 43 
calling it a 25 percent decline, he called it a one percentage point change…Len‟s 44 
findings of “no effect” and the direction of the evaluation – with the whole array 45 
of 25 or so potential outcomes -- sets up a negative bias.  We thought we were 46 
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casting a wide net, but his interpretation is that there were changes in the desired 1 
direction on only one of 25 measures. 2 
 3 
 The actual number of measures was 20 in Dr. Saxe‟s presentation to the final 4 
meeting of the Fighting Back National Advisory Committee in March 2002, but this 5 
would not affect Jellinek‟s sense that the outcome analysis was slanted to make Fighting 6 
Back look like a failure when what he sees “mixed results that provide some basis for 7 
optimism and lots of opportunities for learning.” 8 
 9 
 Floyd Morris noted that the site-by-site or aggregate outcome measurement issue 10 
has been “part of the discussion since the Brandeis team took over” [the evaluation], and 11 
he raised the question at the final meeting of the National Advisory Committee of what 12 
an analysis of the impact of a few sites might produce, as opposed to looking across all 13 
the sites.  Dr. Saxe responded that “If the sites that were the implementation successes are 14 
clustered for analysis, the results are different and better, and it takes less change than is 15 
required for just one site‟s change to be detectable,” but still more than is needed to 16 
detect change across all the collective of 12 sites or across the five sites active in 2002. 17 
 18 
 19 
OPPORTUNITIES TO CHANGE DIRECTION -- NOT TAKEN 20 
 21 
 In retrospect, the Fighting Back story had several turning points at which the turns 22 
were not taken.  On many occasions during the 1988-2002 period, the Foundation 23 
program and evaluation staff engaged in review and reflection with the evaluators, the 24 
National Advisory Committee, the Technical Advisory Committee and/or the Foundation 25 
Board about whether an outcome evaluation was the best fit for Fighting Back and 26 
whether, initially, the PIRE design, or later, the Saxe team‟s design, would provide a 27 
credible answer to the central question, “Did Fighting Back work?”  On every one of 28 
those occasions, the decision was made to stay the course. 29 
 30 
 Greg Dixon described one assumption that might have inclined Foundation staff 31 
to stick to their original plan.  The early Foundation talk, according to Dixon, was “We‟re 32 
going to have the biggest evaluation to date -- $10 million.  No stone will be left 33 
unturned.  There will be measurement of drug use and qualitative studies.”  The 34 
assumption was that a multi-method evaluation of such scale would be able to answer all 35 
the important questions about Fighting Back.  (The $10 million evaluation estimate was 36 
for a program initially funded at $26.4 million – almost 40 percent of the program cost.)  37 
The way Ruby Hearn put this was:  “We felt a huge obligation to communities not to do 38 
harm.  We didn‟t want to do a half-hearted evaluation.”  Other stakeholders describe the 39 
evaluation strategy as “triangulating to find the truth” and “surrounding the problem.” 40 
 41 
 Doubts about the evaluation approach surfaced early, however, even before PIRE 42 
was selected as the first evaluator.  According to Marjorie Gutman, the Foundation 43 
learned in the process of soliciting researchers to submit proposals for the Fighting Back 44 
evaluation, “the evaluators were all skeptical about getting involved in an outcome 45 
evaluation with the community as the unit of analysis and an ill-defined multi-component 46 
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intervention.”  These doubts were raised again at a meeting of the Technical Advisory 1 
Committee after PIRE had been hired.  According to Greg Dixon, the position of the 2 
program staff at that meeting was stated as “We just want to be able to tell at the end if 3 
Fighting Back made a measurable difference.”  As noted at the beginning of this case, 4 
Dixon remembers a Technical Advisory Committee member‟s response as “You‟re not 5 
going to get that.  If you find changes, you won‟t be able to attribute them to Fighting 6 
Back.  The survey isn‟t sensitive enough…”  Ruby Hearn remembers Paul Jellinek asking 7 
the Technical Advisory Committee the same question about the second evaluation 8 
design: “Is what is being proposed going to give us the ability to detect differences?” and 9 
she remembers the Committee response as “Yes, it‟s good enough.”  But she also 10 
remembers major reservations.  Floyd Morris remembers the Technical Advisory 11 
Committee saying “This is the best we can do.” 12 
 13 
 The arrival of Jim Knickman at the Foundation was another point at which there 14 
was an opportunity to change course because Knickman specifically invited it.  Very 15 
early in his tenure at the Foundation, in response to concerns about the evaluation 16 
expressed by the National Program Office and the Fighting Back sites – especially about 17 
the lack of feedback from PIRE -- Dr. Knickman brought the site executive directors and 18 
NPO staff together with the Foundation program staff and a community psychologist 19 
from Rutgers University to examine the possibilities for the evaluation.  As Greg Dixon 20 
remembers the conversation (which Knickman confirms in content), he told the group 21 
directly, “You‟re asking for an awful lot here, holding yourself to a measurable reduction 22 
in use in the Fighting Back communities compared to other communities.  There are 23 
other things you could measure that would be satisfying and I will help you get off the 24 
hook for this outcome evaluation.” 25 
 26 
 Dixon, Knickman, and Marjorie Gutman all remembered the gist of Ruby Hearn‟s 27 
response as, “Yes, we understand that we set our sights very high.  We went to the Board 28 
and promised measurable reductions.  No, thank you.”  As Greg Dixon described 29 
Knickman‟s offer and Hearn‟s reply, “Ruby declined to turn loose of the measurable 30 
reduction commitment.”  Dixon attributes this refusal to the fact that “Both Ruby and 31 
Paul were highly idealistic” – and neither had local program experience nor was an 32 
evaluator.  Dr. Hearn points to her own training in scientific research as one of the 33 
reasons she was willing to proceed with the outcome evaluation:  “When you do the work 34 
well, a negative finding is as important as a positive one.”  Len Saxe concurs that “Ruby 35 
always said, „Even if it doesn‟t come out the way we want it to come out, we need the 36 
information – especially the data on actual alcohol and drug use.‟” 37 
 38 
 Kathryn Edmundson attributes this turn not taken to the Foundation‟s culture – 39 
particularly to its lower regard for community-generated change and community-40 
generated knowledge than for the medical model of testing improvements to people‟s 41 
lives.  She says that Ruby Hearn knew it would be death to community-based initiatives 42 
in the Foundation to claim that they could not be held to the same evaluation standards as 43 
more traditional Foundation initiatives.  Dr. Hearn‟s credo, according to Edmundson, was 44 
that “community-based programs can work in a health care environment and we need to 45 
figure out how to evaluate them.”  So, even when offered the chance to back off her 46 
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commitment to an outcome evaluation, Dr. Hearn would not say that Fighting Back 1 
should not be held to the same evaluation standard as other Foundation health initiatives. 2 
 3 
 When Len Saxe‟s team was selected in 1994 to pick up the pieces from the PIRE 4 
evaluation, the Foundation had another opportunity to reconsider an outcome evaluation.  5 
But, Dr. Saxe reports, “the Foundation [staff] did not want to retreat from outcome 6 
analysis.  That was the goal and that was how the [Foundation] Board was sold.”  And 7 
that was what was reiterated to Saxe‟s evaluation team even though Dr. Saxe told the 8 
staff at that point “you‟re not likely to see reductions in use.” 9 
 10 
 Another potential point of departure from the outcome evaluation course appeared 11 
after Len Saxe‟s evaluation team produced the November 1995 interim report of the 12 
Fighting Back evaluation based on their initial – disappointing -- survey findings.  There 13 
was a 1996 discussion with the Fighting Back National Advisory Committee about these 14 
findings which, according to Saxe, focused on why the Fighting Back evaluation could 15 
not find the magnitude of results that the National Household Survey of Drug Abuse 16 
(NHSDA) had found for the Miami Metropolitan area (more than a 50 percent decline in 17 
use between 1991 and 1993) on the eve of the 1996 Presidential election -- findings that 18 
had been put to effective media use in that election campaign.  The Miami results turned 19 
out to be faulty, apparently because the 1993 Hurricane Andrew had wiped out much 20 
housing and thus a big chunk of the survey sample.
25
  Nevertheless, Saxe says, key 21 
people believed that Miami had succeeded in reducing demand for drugs and that 22 
Fighting Back could achieve the same reductions. 23 
 24 
 Two of these key people were influential in the Foundation‟s decision to get 25 
involved in fighting substance abuse in the first place.  James E. Burke, a former 26 
President and CEO of Johnson & Johnson and a member of the Foundation‟s Board (now 27 
Trustee Emeritus) “has dedicated his life to substance abuse [solutions],” according to 28 
Len Saxe.  He is now the Chairman of The Partnership for a Drug-Free America, which 29 
was the Foundation‟s second major venture after Fighting Back into the arena of 30 
substance abuse with a $3 million grant in 1989.  The Partnership widely promoted 31 
Miami‟s solution to the drug problem.  Jim Knickman believes that at critical junctures in 32 
the history of Fighting Back, Burke‟s support on the Board was decisive.  “Jim Burke 33 
wanted to believe that social problems could be solved by communities without major 34 
government funding for social engineering.  The rest of the Board would follow his lead 35 
if Ruby and Paul had said we could do it.” 36 
 37 
 The second key person who would not be dissuaded about Fighting Back‟s 38 
potential for Miami-sized successes in substance use reductions was Edward T. (“Tad”) 39 
Foote II, Chancellor of the University of Miami at Coral Gables, Chair of the Fighting 40 
Back National Advisory Committee, and founder of The Miami Coalition for For A Safe 41 
and Drug-Free Community.  The Coalition was often cited as the model for community-42 
based anti-drug programs and was credited with the reduction in use found by the faulty 43 
                                               
25  See Andrew A. Beveridge, Charles Kadushin, Leonard Saxe, David Rindskopf and David Livert.  
“Survey Estimates of Drug-Use Trends in Urban Communities: General Principles and Cautionary 
Examples.  In Substance Abuse and Misuse, 35 (6-8), 891-923, 2000. 
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1993 NHSDA.  Between Jim Burke and Tad Foote, Fighting Back had two powerful 1 
believers in the “rightness” of the community coalition approach.  According to Ruby 2 
Hearn, “Jim Burke and others will say that it‟s a good thing for communities to address 3 
their drug problems.  Lots of people who believe that this should go on in communities 4 
don‟t need to see impacts.”  This phenomenon partly explains why Len Saxe says, “I 5 
don‟t think anything we said changed anyone‟s mind.”  Jim Knickman points to the 6 
Foundation‟s culture:  “The Foundation is schizophrenic about evaluation and evidence 7 
versus making a difference.  Even if you‟re not finding impacts, you‟re helping someone 8 
deserving.” 9 
 10 
Another 1996 potential turning point for Fighting Back was the program staff‟s 11 
decision to request renewal of the initiative, and the Board‟s approval of $20.8 million for 12 
eight sites.  Even though there was “some consternation” among the Board members 13 
when Marjorie Gutman presented the 1995 survey results and explained that these data 14 
provided a new baseline, Floyd Morris reported that the Board responded to the 15 
“compelling logic that with substance abuse it is necessary to stay at it for awhile, and no 16 
single institution could be expected to handle it.”  The program staff told the Board there 17 
were examples of successes from the sites – i.e., that it was possible to see specific 18 
accomplishments even if these were not showing up in the early evaluation results – and 19 
so if the Foundation stayed with the initiative longer, there might be measurable effects.  20 
The program staff successfully made the case that substance abuse “is a huge problem 21 
and if we don‟t quite have it right, we need to keep at it.”  22 
 23 
 Neither the equally disappointing results of the 1997 wave or the 1999 wave of 24 
the Fighting Back household survey prompted a change in the evaluation course, but Len 25 
Saxe reported to the March 2002 meeting of the National Advisory Committee that the 26 
Technical Advisory Committee for the evaluation did recommend against a fourth survey 27 
wave.  “Declare failure and write the final report” was the way Dr. Saxe brought their 28 
advice.  Although he would have preferred more data, in order to determine if 29 
environmental factors affecting use that could be affected at the community level were 30 
sustained through 2002, Saxe is ready to write that report and Jim Knickman agreed that 31 
the survey would not continue. 32 
 33 
 Reflecting on this course, Ruby Hearn said, 34 
 35 
There were lots of points along the way when both program and evaluation people 36 
should have said, “Things aren‟t going the way we thought.”  But the farther 37 
down the road you get, the harder it is to bail out.  And you have a tendency to see 38 
the glass half full, to keep trying, to give it a little more time.  When you‟re trying 39 
something that hasn‟t been tried before, your assumptions are that it will take a 40 
while to figure it out. 41 
 42 
 And, “it was hard to be strategic,” she said, “because „We‟re going to focus‟ is 43 
extremely politically difficult” when the problem populations are minority populations.  44 
 45 
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 Len  Saxe‟s view of why the Foundation stuck to the outcome evaluation course 1 
is: 2 
 3 
The Foundation took the evaluation rubric too literally.  What was needed was 4 
research on the problem, but they got sidetracked by trying to grade the program 5 
and not learning.  If they had been tracking [drug and alcohol] use between 1989 6 
and 1992, they wouldn‟t have implemented the same model. 7 
 8 
 9 
2002:  CONCERN ABOUT THE TAKE-HOME MESSAGE 10 
 11 
 The last national Fighting Back conference will be held at the end of 2002, where 12 
site representatives, Foundation staff, National Program Office staff, the evaluators, and 13 
advisors will gather to review the initiative experience.  The “take-home message” for 14 
that conference, as described by David Rosenbloom in March 2002, is that “we have a 15 
basic reality problem:  An elegant evaluation contracted by the Foundation is going to 16 
come out exceedingly negative.  But the evaluation team does not agree [that their 17 
findings will affect the field negatively.]”  There was much discussion at the March 2002 18 
National Advisory Committee meeting about possible spins on the evaluation findings.  19 
Jim Knickman reminded the group that “the Foundation hires independent evaluators and 20 
encourages them to say what they think.” 21 
 22 
 What is at stake from Paul Jellinek‟s perspective, and Greg Dixon and other 23 
stakeholders agree, is the federal government‟s interest in continuing to fund community 24 
coalitions for anti-drug work.  Mathea Falco, President of Drug Strategies, a non-profit 25 
policy research group that promotes “public and private efforts to reduce demand for 26 
drugs through prevention, education, treatment, law enforcement and community 27 
initiatives,” does not want the evaluation results to “cut the knees off of the movement.” 28 
 29 
Out of frustration with the national evaluation, David Rosenbloom has initiated a 30 
systematic effort to identify the lessons Fighting Back has to offer the field – essentially 31 
to retrospectively create a local implementation study – and, at the request of Paul 32 
Jellinek, the NPO is directing an effort to reanalyze the outcome results. 33 
 34 
 Discussions have begun at the Foundation about communicating the findings and 35 
lessons for the Foundation, discussions that will involve outgoing Foundation President 36 
Steven Schroeder.  Jim Knickman says that it is unlikely there will be any official 37 
Foundation statement about the results of Fighting Back unless some “middle ground” 38 
can be found between what are now opposing views.  Floyd Morris reports that “there is 39 
a sense that we won‟t be doing anything like this anytime soon,” mainly because “we 40 
can‟t conclude whether or not it worked.” 41 
 42 
 43 
 44 
 45 
 46 
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